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1 Introduction
A common objective and also an obligation of the new entrant countries to the European Union (EU) is the
accession to the European Monetary Union (EMU).1 Importantly, these economies share common characteristics
such as a rapid productivity growth and vulnerability to external disturbances. Moreover, they are small and
relatively open. At the same time their monetary policies are obliged to satisfy the Maastricht convergence
criteria which stand for the prerequisites to enter the EMU. All the EMU accession countries should achieve a
high and durable degree of price stability, which in quantitative terms is reected in low ination rates and low
long-term interest rates. Additionally, nominal exchange rates of the EMU accession countries versus the euro
should stay within normal uctuation margins provided for by the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European
Monetary System.
Thus the choice of the monetary policy regime in these countries is crucial for their compliance with the
Maastricht criteria. In reality we observe a heterogeneity in the choice of the regime among the EMU accession
countries. Baltic countries (i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and also Bulgaria chose to peg to the euro. The
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia decided for the managed oating regime while Poland and Romania
went for the exible regime with CPI strict targeting. What is more, many EMU accession countries do not
fulll some of the Maastricht criteria. Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia fail
to fulll the CPI ination criterion. Hungary and Romania violate the nominal interest rate criterion. Poland,
Slovakia and Romania do not comply with the nominal exchange rate criterion.2
The goal of this paper is to study the ability of di¤erent monetary regimes to comply with the Maastricht
criteria. To provide a proper framework for the analysis, we build a small open economy model with nominal
rigidities and two production sectors: a nontraded and traded good sector. In this way, we want to take
account of the empirical literature that emphasizes the role of sector productivity shocks in shaping ination
and real exchange rate dynamics in the EMU accession countries (see Mihaljek and Klau (2004)). At the same
time, we follow the theoretical literature that argues that existence of the nontraded sector helps to explain
international business cycle dynamics (Benigno and Thoenisen (2003) and Altissimo et al (2004)). We perform
policy experiments by changing the monetary regimes and analyzing their implications on the compliance with
the Maastricht criteria. The monetary regimes we study reect current choices of the EMU accession countries,
i.e. peg regime, managed oat and exible exchange rate regime with CPI ination targeting.
The interaction between the Maastricht requirements and the monetary regimes has attracted the interest
of academics. For example, Buiter and Grafe (2003) and Coricelli (2002)) call for adopting the peg regime
in these countries as it enhances the credibility of the monetary policies and also strengthens links with the
EU and EMU. Similarly, Ravenna (2005) nds that the gain from a credible adoption of the xed regime can
1On the 1st of May 2004 10 Central and Eastern European countries, i.e. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, entered the European Union. Additionally, Bulgaria and Romania entered the EU
on 1st of January 2007. Importantly all these countries are entitled to enter the EMU as it was stated in their accession agreement
with the EU. Slovenia is the rst country in this group that joined the European Monetary Union on January 1, 2007. Cyprus and
Malta joined the EMU on January 1, 2008.
2See gures (2), (3), (4) in Appendix B.
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outweigh the loss of monetary policy independence. At the same time, all these authors acknowledge that the
peg regime can prevent from the compliance with the Maastricht CPI ination criterion and suggest that this
criterion should be revised. On the other hand, Devereux (2003) and Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) nd that
the monetary regime characterized by exible ination targeting with some weight on exchange rate stability
should comply with the Maastricht criteria.
There are several caveats of the previous studies that this paper aims to eliminate. First of all, the studies
concentrate mainly on the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect (Balassa (1964)) and therefore on the implications of only
one type of shocks, i.e. traded productivity shocks, on the monetary regime choice. We analyze responses of the
monetary regimes to both domestic supply and demand shocks and also external shocks. Moreover, the policy
recommendations could be sensitive to structural di¤erences among the EMU accession countries. We discuss
thoroughly implications of openness, trade specialization pattern and also degree of exchange rate pass through
on the choice of monetary regime that would satisfy the Maastricht criteria. Finally, most of the studies discuss
the ability of di¤erent monetary regimes to satisfy the criteria in qualitative terms. We provide a quantitative
framework that enables us to evaluate whether a given monetary regime can satisfy the Maastricht criteria.
Our results can be summarized as follows. There exists a signicant trade-o¤ between compliance with the
CPI ination criterion and the nominal interest rate criterion. Under the benchmark specication (which aims
to reect the Czech Republic economy) none of the regimes satises all the criteria. The sensitivity analysis
reveals that the probability that some of the regimes will satisfy all the criteria increases with openness of the
economy and also degree of substitution between traded goods. Moreover, provided that two previous conditions
are satised, degree of exchange rate pass through determines which of the regimes can comply with the criteria.
Specically, low degree of pass through enables regimes with managed exchange rate to fulll all the criteria
while high degree of pass through implies that the CPI targeting regime satises all the criteria.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some stylized facts on the EMU accession countries
based on the empirical literature. Section 3 describes the model and contrasts it with the existing theoretical
literature. Section 4 and 5 focus on the determinants of the macroeconomic volatility in the long run and
in the short run respectively. Section 6 presents comparison of the monetary regimes under the benchmark
parameterization. Section 7 reports the sensitivity analysis results on the structural parameters and their
impact on the monetary regime performance. Section 8 concludes indicating further research directions.
2 Stylized facts on the EMU accession economies
Our aim is to detect important characteristics of the EMU accession countries which a¤ect the choice of the
monetary regime in these countries. Importantly we study the determinants of macroeconomic volatility in these
countries. Moreover we have a close look at some structural parameters which can be indicative for the choice
of the monetary regime. Finally we analyze briey economic performance of the EMU accession economies on
the basis of their monetary regime choice.
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All the EMU accession countries can be treated as small open economies. Their real GDP do not exceed
1% of the nominal GDP of the euro area (except for Poland for which the ratio amounts to 3%). However
structure of these economies varies as far as share of nontraded sector and degree of openness are concerned.3
In particular the ratio of imports in their nominal GDP ranges from 37% (for Poland) up to 83% (for Estonia).
Importantly the euro area countries are the biggest trading partner of these countries with the share on average
of 50% in their total trade.
As far as the stochastic environment of the EMU accession countries is concerned, Sueppel (2003) nds that
these countries are characterized by higher growth and wider output uctuations than the euro area and other
EU countries.4 Moreover he identies that the degree of synchronization of their business cycles with the euro
area is smaller and heterogenous than of the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark. This a consequence of
the stabilization process taking place in these countries and reected in the structural reforms, infrastructure
improvements and a high productivity growth.
Having in mind the restrictions set on the monetary policy in the accession countries we nd important to
identify the main determinants of the real exchange rate dynamics which summarize pressures on the Maastricht
variables, i.e.: ination, nominal interest rate and nominal exchange rate.
Since all the EMU accession countries are characterized by a high productivity growth (especially in the
tradable sector) many researchers test the hypothesis of the Balassa - Samuelson e¤ect for these countries.
According to the Balassa -Samuelson e¤ect (Balassa (1964)) a country which experiences a higher productivity
growth in the traded sector will face higher consumer prices and subsequently real exchange rate appreciation.
An existence of the strong Balassa - Samuelson e¤ect could endanger the attempts of keeping low ination
di¤erential between these countries and the euro area. We can list the following empirical studies analyzing the
Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect in the EMU accession countries: Cipriani (2001), de Broeck and Slok (2001), Egert et
al. (2002), Fisher (2002), Halpern and Wyplosz (2001), Coricelli and Jazbec (2001), Arratibel et al. (2002) and
Mihaljek and Klau (2004). The main ndings of these papers are rather diverse. The estimates indicate that
the Balassa - Samuelson e¤ect can explain from 0 - 3.5% per annum of the existing di¤erence between ination
rates in the transition countries and the euro area.5
The original formulation of the Balassa - Samuelson theory totally neglects the role of the demand side of
an economy in a¤ecting the real exchange rate dynamics.6 Some authors such as de Gregorio et el. (1994), de
Broeck and Slok (2001), Cova (2004) and Astrov (2005) and Dufrenot et al. (2003) point out that in reality
also demand side shocks can lead to real exchange rate appreciation and inationary pressures. According
to de Broeck and Slok (2001) observed growth of incomes in the EMU accession countries can increase the
demand for nontradable goods and subsequently their price. Additionally since government expenditures fall
3Detailed data can be found in Appendix B.
4See gure (1) in Appendix B.
5These di¤erent results come from the varied methodologies used and also diverse treatment of the data: especially the share of
nontradable goods in the economies and inclusion of the regulated prices in it. Moreover many studies neglected also a signicant
rise in productivity of nontradables and existence of the nontradable component in tradable goods.
6This is due to very restrictive assumptions such as homogeneity of traded goods, perfect competition in the traded good sector
and perfect mobility of production factors.
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predominantly on the nontraded goods they lead to a rise of price of nontradables. Moreover de Gregorio and
Wolf (1994), Cova (2004) and Astrov (2005)7 argue that demand shocks in the accession countries can lead to
terms of trade improvements and through the income e¤ect to real exchange rate appreciation and ination.
Astrov (2005) nds that real exchange rate in the EMU accession countries is a¤ected positively by terms of
trade (depreciation e¤ect) and negatively by the share of government expenditures (appreciation e¤ect) in the
gross domestic product.8 Additionally Dufrenot et al. (2003)9 report that public nances and current account
inuence the real exchange rate dynamics. Their substantial deterioration is reected in the real exchange rate
depreciation.
The described demand side and supply side shocks constitute qualitatively for the common factors shaping
the macroeconomic volatility in the EMU accession countries. Still there exist initial conditions, i.e. inationary
environment and structural parameters such as degree of openness and degree of exchange rate pass-through
which make the countries to choose di¤erent monetary regimes.
Interestingly as far as the initial conditions are concerned Klyuev (2001) in his model of exchange rate
regime choice in the EMU accession countries10 nds the nonlinear relationship between the rate of ination
and the degree of exchange rate exibility. The panel study indicates that a rise in ination from a low level
suggests introduction of more exible exchange rate regimes while an increase in already high ination is a sign
to implement a rather xed regime. The xed regime present in the environment of considerable rigidities in
both labour and goods market may lead to a decrease in the competitiveness of a country. That is why several
Central and Eastern European countries (i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) have decided recently
to introduce more exible exchange rate arrangements.
Moreover the traditional Optimum Currency Area theory indicates that countries that are more open and
therefore more vulnerable to nominal exchange rate movements should opt for the xed regime. This can be
somewhat explanatory for the case of Estonia which chose to peg and on the other pole for Poland which opted
for the exible regime.11
The degree of exchange rate pass through in an economy, i.e. the degree to which extent nominal exchange
rate uctuations feed into the domestic prices and a¤ect the rate of ination in the economy is especially crucial
for small, open economies. According to Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and also empirical studies by Chaudry and
Hakura (2002) and Devereux and Yetman (2003) exchange rate shocks in the emerging economies tend to feed
into aggregate ination at a much faster pace than in the industrialized economies. This fact inuences the
choice of monetary policy which should be used to adjust to external shocks. Moreover it raises the question of
7The authors argue that these demand shocks are reected in an increased demand for the tradables due to quality improvements
(consistent with a changing composition of the tradables in the EMU accession countries). In that way the Balassa - Samuelson
e¤ect can be replicated as long as the productivity increase consists in a quality improvement and a rise in the price of tradables.
8 It is a panel regression study. The countries included in the sample are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania. The sample period for the study is 1990-2001. In this study one can also nd the summary of
some of the previous results.
9The authors of this study use the structural VAR and Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate methodology. The study is is
developed for 5 countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
10His study includes 13 Central and Eastern European economies: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, LIthuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
11 see Table 1 in Appendix A.
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how important the exchange rate adjustment should be in the chosen monetary rule.
Importantly the large pass through together with observed rigidities in the labour and goods market endanger
the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy and suggest implementation of strict exchange rate targeting. Additionally
Coricelli and Jazbec (2004) in their study on the four EMU accession countries nd that managed oat policies
aimed at accommodating the adverse shocks on the real exchange rate can actually induce the strong exchange
rate pass-through.12 That is why Slovenia and Hungary (opting for more xed regimes) are reported to expe-
rience perfect pass-through while in case of the Czech Republic and Poland (opting for more exible regimes)
this degree is much smaller.
Summing up the EMU accession economies experience common driving forces a¤ecting their macroeconomic
volatility. Still they di¤er in some structural parameters and ultimate choices of the monetary regimes. The
natural question which arises now how the choice of the monetary regime can inuence the macroeconomic
volatility of a country and compliance with the Maastricht criteria. A quick look at the data presented in
the Appendix B indicates that countries following monetary regimes that entails some degree of the nominal
exchange rate stabilisation are characterised by strong productivity growth but at the same time experience
higher ination rates, which can endanger compliance with the Maastricht criteria.
3 The Model
We build a small scale model of an accession economy with the aim to study how di¤erent monetary regimes
perform in stabilizing the Maastricht variables, i.e. ination, nominal interest rate and nominal exchange rate
in the stochastic environment. We present an EMU accession economy as a small open economy interacting
with the rest of the world economy - proxied as the euro area. We model a small open economy as the limiting
case of a two country model where the size of one of the countries is set to zero. In each of the economies there
are two good sectors: nontraded and traded goods. We consider highly integrated two economies where asset
markets are complete. The structure of labour markets is such that labour is mobile between sectors in each
country and immobile between the countries. We assume existence of home bias in consumption which is a
function of the relative size of an economy and its degree of openness.13
Purchasing power parity (PPP) is violated due to three reasons: existence of the nontraded sector, home
bias in consumption and also local currency pricing in the traded good sector which violates law of one price.
Moreover, in order to study a role of the monetary policy, we introduce monopolistic competition and price
rigidities with staggered Calvo contracts in all the good sectors. However we abstract from any monetary
frictions by assuming cashless limiting economies. Importantly existence of market power in the traded good
sector opens up role for terms of trade in transmission of the shocks. Additionally, local currency pricing in the
12The reaction function of such a policy responds to disequilibria in the real exchange rate rather than deviations from the
infaltion and/or nominal exchange rate target.
13This assumption enables us to consider a limit case of the zero size of the home economy and concentrate on the small open
economy.
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traded good sector induces the imperfect exchange rate pass - through into domestic prices.14 The stochastic
environment of the small open economy is characterized by asymmetric productivity shocks originating in both
domestic sectors, preference shocks and foreign consumption shocks.
The model can be seen as an extension of a one-sector small open economy model of De Paoli (2004).
Moreover, it is also similar in its structure to two-country models of Benigno and Thoenisen (2003) and Altissimo
et al (2004).15 As far as the literature on monetary policy in the EMU accession economies is concerned our
model is closely related to Devereux (2003), Natalucci and Ravenna (2003). Importantly, their specication of
the traded good sector (i.e. domestic rms are price takers) implies exogeneity of terms of trade.
3.1 Households
The world economy consists of a measure one of agents: [0; n) belonging to the small country (home) and [n; 1]
belonging to the rest of the world - the euro area (foreign). There are two types of di¤erentiated goods produced
in each country: traded and nontraded goods. Home traded goods are indexed on the interval [0; n) and foreign
traded goods on the interval [n; 1] respectively. The same applies to the nontraded goods. Since our focus is on
the limiting case of a two-country model we show only equations of the home economy. Foreign variables are
indexed with :
Households are assumed to be innitely lived and they behave according to the permanent income hypothesis.
Moreover in each country they can choose between three types of goods: nontraded, domestic traded and foreign
traded goods. Cit represents consumption at period t of a domestic consumer i and L
i
t stands for his labour
supply. Each agent i maximizes the following utility function:16
maxEt0
( 1X
t=t0
t t0

U
 
Cit ; Bt
  V  Lit
)
(1)
where Et denotes the expectation conditional on the information set at date t,  is the intertemporal
discount factor and 0 <  < 1; U() stands for ows of utility from consumption and V () represents ows of
disutility from supplying labour.17 C is a composite consumption index. We dene consumerspreferences over
the composite consumption index Ct of tradable goods (CT;t) (domestically - produced and foreign ones) and
nontradable goods (CN;t):
Ct 


1
C
 1

N;t + (1  )
1
C
 1

T;t
 
 1
(2)
14 In Section 7 we discuss an alternative pricing of rms, i.e. producer currency pricing.
15 In both papers the assumption regarding a two-sector structure of an economy plays a crucial role. Benigno and Thoenisen
(2003) examine the real exchange rate uctuations between United Kingdom and the euro area and analyze whether Balassa-
Samuelson e¤ect could explain the real exchange rate appreciation of the British pound in the nineties. Altissimo et al. (2004)
focus their analysis on the determinants of ination di¤erentials in a currency area.
16 In general we assume that U is twice di¤erentiable, increasing and concave in Ct and V is twice di¤erentiable, increasing and
convex in Lt.
17We assume specic functional forms of the consumption utility U
 
Cit

, and disutility from labour V
 
Lit

: U
 
Cit
  Bt (Cit)1 
1  ;
V
 
Lit
  'l (Lit)1+1+ with  ( > 0) - the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and  (  0) - the
inverse of the labour supply elasticity.
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where  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods and  2 [0; 1] is the
share of the nontraded goods in the overall consumption. The traded good consumption is a composite of the
domestically - produced traded goods (CH) and foreign produced traded goods (CF ):
CT;t 
h

1
C
 1

H;t + (1  )
1
C
 1

F;t
i 
 1
(3)
where  > 0 is elasticity of substitution between home traded and foreign traded goods,  - home bias being
the function of the relative size of the small economy with respect to the foreign one and its degree of openness
 such that (1   ) = (1   n) and  2 [0; 1].18 Let us notice that degree of openness is related to degree of
home bias, i.e. the higher degree of openness the smaller degree of home bias. Finally, Cj (where j = H;N) is
a consumption sub-index of the continuum of di¤erentiated goods:
Cj;t 
24 1
n
 1

nZ
0
ct (j)
j 1
j dj
35  1 (4)
where  > 1 represent elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods in each of the sectors. The
consumption - based price indices expressed in the units of currency of the respective country are the following
ones:
Pt 
h
P 1 N;t + (1  )P 1 T;t
i 1
1 
(5)
PT;t 
h
P 1 H;t + (1  )P 1 F;t
i 1
1 
(6)
with
Pj;t 
24 1
n
 nZ
0
pt (j)
1 
dj
35 11  : (7)
The existence of the nontraded goods, assumed home bias and also possibility of local currency pricing cause
the deviations from purchasing power parity. So P 6= SP  (where S stands for the nominal exchange rate).
The real exchange rate can be dened in the following manner: RS = SP

P : Moreover we dene the terms of
trade as T = PFPH and the domestic terms of trade as T
d = PNPT .
In order to represent the small open economy limiting case we use the denition of  and set n ! 0: From
consumerspreferences we can derive total demand of the generic goods - n (home nontraded goods) and h
18This specication is based on De Paoli (2004).
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(home traded goods):
yd(n) =

p(n)
PN
  
PN
P
 
C (8)
yd(h) =

p(h)
PH
  
PH
PT
 
(1  )CT +

p(h)
P H
  
P H
P T
 
CT (9)
Households get disutility from supplying labour to all the rms present in each country. Each individual
supplies labour to both sectors, i.e. traded and nontraded one:
Lit = L
i;H
t + L
i;N
t : (10)
We assume that consumers have the access to a complete set of securities - contingent claims traded inter-
nationally. Each household faces the following budget constraint:
PtC
i
t + EtfQt;t+1Dt+1g  Dt + PtTRit +W iH;tLiH;t +W iN;tLiN;t +
nR
0
iN;tdi
n
+
nR
0
iH;tdi
n
(11)
where at date t: Dt+1 - nominal payo¤ of the portfolio held at the end of period (t), Qt;t+1 - the stochastic
discount factor for one-period ahead nominal payo¤s relevant to the domestic household, H;t and N;t -
nominal prots from the domestic rms and TRit - nominal lump sum transfers from the domestic government
to the household i. The similar budget constraint can be written for the foreign economy. Moreover in both
countries consumers face no Ponzi game restriction. The short term interest rate (Rt) is dened as the price of
the portfolio which delivers one unit of currency in each contingency that occurs next period:
R 1t = EtfQt;t+1g (12)
The maximization problem of any household consists in maximizing discounted stream of utility (1) subject
to the budget constraint (11) in order to determine the optimal path of the consumption index, labour index
and contingent claims at all times. The solution to the household decision problem gives a set of rst order
conditions.19 Optimization of the portfolio holdings leads to the following Euler equations for the home and
foreign economy:
UC(Ct; Bt) = Et

UC(Ct+1; Bt+1)Q
 1
t;t+1
Pt
Pt+1

(13)
UC(C

t ) = Et

UC(C

t+1)Q
 1
t;t+1
StP

t
St+1P t+1

(14)
There is a perfect sharing in this setting meaning that marginal rates of consumption in nominal terms are
19We suppress here subscript i as we assume that in equilibrium all the agents are identical. Therefore we represent optimality
conditions for a representative agent.
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equalized between countries in all states and at all times:
UC(C

t+1)
UC(Ct )
Pt+1
Pt
=
UC(Ct+1; Bt+1)
UC(Ct; Bt)
St+1P

t+1
StP t
(15)
Moreover choosing appropriately the distribution of initial wealth we obtain that:
UC(Ct; Bt)
UC(Ct )
= 
Pt
StP t
(16)
where  > 0 and depends on the initial wealth distribution. We have to point out here that although the
assumption of complete markets conveniently simplies the model it neglects a possibility of wealth e¤ects as a
result of the shocks.
The optimality condition for the labour supply is the following one:
W kt (i)
Pt
=
VL(L
i
t)
UC(Cit ; Bt)
(17)
where W k(i) - nominal wage of the consumer i in the sector k (k = H;N): So the real wage is equal to the
marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption.20
3.2 Firms
All the rms are owned by consumers. Both traded and nontraded sectors are monopolistically competitive.
Since rms use only labour as their output the production function for rm i in sector k (k = H;N) is the
following one:
Yk;t(i) = A
k
tL
k
t (i) (18)
Subsequently the nominal marginal cost for the rm i in sector k is:
MCkt (i) =
W kt (i)
Akt
: (19)
3.2.1 Nontraded sector
Prices are set according to Calvo pricing scheme. Each period a fraction of rms (1   N ) decides their price
maximizing the future expected prots.
The maximization problem of any rm in the nontraded sector at time t is given by:
20Notice that wages are equalised between the sectors inside each of the economies due to perfect labour mobility and perfect
competition in the labour market.
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max
PN;t0 (i)
Et0
1X
t=t0
(N )
tQt0;t

(1  N )PN;t0(i) MCNt (i)

Y dN;t0:t(i) (20)
subject to Y dN;t0:t(i) =

PN;t0(i)
PN;t
 
YN;t (21)
where Y dN;t0:t(i) - demand for the individual good produced by rm i at time t conditional on keeping the
price PN;t0(i) xed at the level chosen at time t0; MC
N
t - nominal marginal cost in the nontraded sector at
time t, N - revenue taxes in the nontraded sector.
Let us notice that in the exible price equilibrium the optimal price in the nontraded sector is set at any
time according to the following relation:
ePN;t(i)
Pt
= NMC
N;r
t
Pt
PN;t
(22)
where N =

( 1)(1 N ) and MC
N;r
t =
WNt (i)
PtANt
:
In the sticky price environment we obtain the following ination equation:
bN;t = kN (  bANt + b!t   (1  b) bT dt ) + EtbN;t+1; (23)
where kN =
(1 N)(1 N )
N
and b = (T dpT )1  - represents a share of nontraded goods in the consumption
basket of the small open economy evaluated at the steady state:
According to equation (23) the sector ination (bN;t) depends on changes in the real marginal cost and the
relative prices. Real marginal cost decreases due to productivity increases ( bANt ) and raises in result of higher
real wages (b!t). Additionally a rise in the relative price of nontraded goods generates a substitution e¤ect away
from this sector and leads to deationary pressures. The magnitude of this e¤ect depends inversely on the share
of nontraded goods in the domestic consumption basket.
3.2.2 Traded sector
As far as the traded goods are concerned we assume a possibility of price discrimination between domestic
market and a foreign one. We study two alternative pricing decisions: local currency pricing (LCP) and
producer currency pricing (PCP). The rst one implies delayed pass-through while the second one implies
perfect exchange pass-through. As a benchmark scenario we choose LCP pricing. In Section 7 we discuss
thoroughly implications of higher pass-through and PCP on performance of alternative monetary regimes.
Under LCP rms in the traded good sector decide their prices maximising the expected prots subject to
the demand schedule in a given market, i.e. domestic or foreign one:21
21We can separate pricing decisions depending on the market since our production function is linear.
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 domestic market
max
PH;t0 (i)
Et0
1X
t=t0
(H)
sQt0;t

(1  H)PH;t0(i) MCHt (i)

Y dH;t0:t(i) (24)
subject to Y dH;t0:t(i) =

PH;t0(i)
PH;t
 
CH;t; (25)
 foreign market
max
PH;t0 (i)
Et
1X
s=0
(H)
sQt0;t

(1  H)StP H;t0(i) MCHt

Y dH;t0:t(i) (26)
subject to Y dH;t0:t(i) =
 
P H;t0(i)
P H;t
! 
Y H;t: (27)
where Y dH;t0:t(i); Y
d
H;t0:t
(i) - demands for the individual good produced by rm i at time t in the domestic
and export home traded sector conditional on keeping, respectively, the prices PH;t0(i) and P

H;t0
(i) xed at the
level chosen at time t0; MCHt - nominal marginal cost in the home traded sector at time t, H - revenue taxes
in the home traded sector.
When prices are exible the optimal prices in the home traded sector, i.e. the internal price ePH;t and export
price eP H;t are set at any time according to the following relations:
ePH;t(i)
Pt
= HMC
H;r
t
Pt
PH;t
; (28)
eP H;t(i)
P t
= HMC
H;r
t
1
RSt
P t
P H;t
(29)
where H =

( 1)(1 H) and MC
H;r
t =
WHt (i)
PtAHt
:
In the sticky price environment we obtain two sector ination equations for goods in the traded sector, i.e.
home traded ination bH;t and export traded ination bH;t:
bH;t = kH(  bAHt + b!t + b bT dt + abTt) + EtbH;t+1 (30)
bH;t = kH(  bAHt + b!t   cRSt + bT t + b bT dt ) + EtbH;t+1 (31)
where kH =
(1 H)(1 H)
H
; kH =
(1 H)(1 H)
H
; and a; b; a; b are the steady state ratios:
As in the coase of nontraded sector, sector ination is driven by changes in the real marginal cost and
relative prices. As far as the export sector is concerned, ination dynamics are also a¤ected by real exchange
rate changes, e.g. real exchange rate depreciation leads to deationary pressures in this sector.
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Similarly, we can derive the optimal prices for the both markets of the foreign traded good sector. As a
result, we obtain the following ination equation for the import sector of our small open economy:
bF;t = kF (  bAFt + b!t + cRSt   (1  a) bTt + b bT dt ) + EtbF;t+1: (32)
Under PCP ination in the import and export sector of the small open economy is driven entirely by domestic
ination of a given sector and nominal exchange rate movements (bSt = bSt  bSt 1), i.e. ination in the export
sector: bH;t = bH;t  bSt; ination in the import sector: bF;t = bF;t +bSt:
3.3 Monetary and scal policies
The government in this small open economy occupies with collecting revenue taxes which are later redistributed
to households in the form of lump sum transfers in such a way that each period there is a balanced budget:
nZ
0
 t (PH;t(i)YH;t(i) + PN;t(i)YN;t(i)) di =
nZ
0
TRjtdj (33)
The existence of price stickiness and also other rigidities in the model such as deviations from PPP provide
a role for the monetary policy. The distortion caused by monopolistic competition is o¤set by setting the
appropriate output subsidies for each of the domestic sectors in the steady state so that output in the exible
price equilibrium is e¢ cient.22
The monetary authority uses a short-term interest rate as its instrument. The general form of the interest
rate feedback rule is the following one:
eRt = t 1

 St 1
S
S
R (34)
where ; S are the feedback coe¢ cients to CPI ination around a target rate  ( is the steady state
value of CPI ination); nominal exchange rate around a target level of S ( S is the steady state value of the
nominal exchange rate), R - the steady state value of the nominal interest rate: We also assume the interest
rate smoothing:
Rt = eRt1 Rt 1"mpt (35)
where  - the rate of interest rate smoothing, "mpt - the monetary policy shock (exogenous).
The loglinearised (around the steady state) version of equation (34) is the following:
bRt = (1  )bt + S(1  )bSt +  bRt 1 + b"mpt (36)
where bRt = ln RtR .
22See Appendix A for derivation of the e¢ cient steady state. As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) we assume that the average
level of output is optimal and independent of monetary policy.
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This form of the feedback rule allows us to study di¤erent regimes chosen by the EMU accession countries.23
We follow here approach presented by Natalucci and Ravenna (2003). In particular the exible exchange rate
regime with the CPI targeting is characterised by a strong feedback coe¢ cient to uctuations in the aggregate
ination ( ! 1). On the other side the xed regime is characterised by a strong feedback coe¢ cient to
uctuations in the nominal exchange rate (S ! 1).24 The managed oat involves both nonzero feedback
coe¢ cients to uctuations in the nominal exchange rate and ination.
4 Macroeconomic volatility in the long run
This section analyzes the long run e¤ects of the stochastic shocks in the presented small open economy envi-
ronment. We solve the model by taking rst order approximation around the steady state in the exible price
environment. Importantly the exible price environment can be considered as the long run equilibrium towards
which the sticky price equilibrium converges. Subsequently the solution of the model will provide us with the
representation of the variables as functions of the stochastic shocks.
We focus on the real exchange rate dynamics as it can give us insight on the dynamics of the Maastricht
variables in the sticky price environment.
From the supply relations in the exible price environment ((22)) and the denition of the real exchange
rate we can obtain the following relations between relative prices:
d
T d;nt = bAHt   bANt   acTnt ; (37)
dRSnt =  bdT d;nt + (1  a)cTnt : (38)
where dT d;nt ; cTnt ; dRSnt - uctuations (around the steady) of domestic terms of trade, terms of trade and real
exchange rate in the exible price environment.
As a consequence the real exchange rate can be represented as a function of the productivity shocks and
terms of trade:
dRSnt =  b bAHt + b bANt + (1  a(1  b))cTnt (39)
The above equation indicates that real exchange rate depends positively on the productivity shocks occurring
in the domestic nontraded sector and negatively on the productivity shocks occurring in the domestic traded
sector. However also terms of trade have to be taken into account when analyzing the overall e¤ect of the
stochastic shocks on the real exchange rate dynamics.
23The monetary rule used for parameterization has a slightly more general form as it involves also response coe¢ cient to aggregate
output uctuations (see Section 6).
24Notice that combining the Euler conditions for both economies and risk sharing condition we obtain an uncovered interest rate
parity condition that directly links changes in the nominal exchange rate to nominal interest rates in both countries: bSt+1 =bRt   bRt : Therefore in the case of the domestic shocks under the peg regime the nominal interest rate does not react.
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The assumption of imperfect substitution and the existence of market power in the domestic traded sector
appears to be crucial when analysing the validity of the Balassa Samuelson hypothesis and its inationary
impact on the EMU accession countries. In our framework when productivity shock in the domestic traded
sector occurs we observe a rise in the ratio of domestic terms of trade through a unied labour market channel
and increased real wages in the whole economy. Moreover the higher the share of nontraded goods the higher this
appreciation e¤ect on the real exchange rate. However since the home and foreign traded goods are imperfect
substitutes we observe a lower price of the home traded goods in relation to the foreign ones. This worsens the
terms of trade and has a depreciation e¤ect on the real exchange rate.25 This e¤ect is stronger the smaller the
degree of openness, the higher share of nontraded goods and a smaller degree of substitutability between home
and foreign traded goods. So overall e¤ect of the home traded productivity shocks on the real exchange rate is
not certain.26
Importantly productivity shocks in the home nontraded sector lead to real exchange rate depreciation due
to a decline in the domestic terms of trade accompanied by a rise in terms of trade. Morever domestic demand
shocks result in real exchange rate appreciation through its positive e¤ect on the domestic terms of trade and
negative e¤ect on terms of trade. Domestic demand shocks lead to a higher relative price of home goods which
results in a decline of terms of trade.
These conslusions are in contrast with Devereux (2003) and Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) who base their
analyses on the assumption that home traded prices are xed internationally. This suposition is based on the
argument that accession countries cannot a¤ect their terms of trade. As a result terms of trade are treated
exogenously and cannot act as transmitters and absorbers of shocks. That is why in their framework we observe
a strong real exchange appreciation in presence of the home traded productivity shocks (see (39) when cTnt -
exogenous). It is important to note that in such a framework there is no role for demand shocks as real exchange
rate dynamics are determined entirely by productivity shocks in both domestic sectors.
Summing up the real exchange rate and therefore ination movements can be a result of both demand and
supply side shocks. In our analysis we identify a set of the crucial structural parameters which inuence the way
real exchange rate responds to the shocks. These are: share of nontraded goods in the aggregate consumption,
degree of openness and degree of substitutability between home and foreign traded goods.
5 Macroeconomic volatility in the short run
In the short run when prices are sticky the real exchange rate adjustment to the new steady state depends on
the chosen monetary rule, i.e. behaviour of the nominal interest rate. Combining international risk sharing
25as in Benigno and Thoenisen (2003) and Altissimo et al (2004).
26A recent empirical literature sheds some light on this uncertain e¤ect of home tradable productivity shocks. In particular
Arratibel et al. (2002) report that ination in the EMU accession countries is negatively a¤ected by labour productivity increases
in the manufacturing sector (in many empirical studies the sectorial productivity is proxied by labour productivity). This nding
is based on the panel study on determinants of dual ination (in tradable and nontradable goods) in the chosen EMU accession
countries. The regression equation (with ination as the dependent variable) is based on the hybrid new Phillips curve equation with
some other explanatory variables such as: exchange rate regime, productivity growths, liberalisation index, oil prices, government
decit ratios, unemployment ratios, GDP, euro area GDP growth and terms of trade.
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condition and Euler condition we obtain that the real exchange rate is a function of the current and future real
interest rate di¤erentials between the small domestic economy and the foreign one (see (13), (14), (16)):
cRSt = Et 1X
i=0
h bRt+i   bt+i+1   bRt+i   bt+i+1i (40)
However on the contrary to the exible price environment where the real interest rates are functions of the
shocks the real interest rates are formed by the chosen monetary rule.
The current and future decisions on the real interest rates are reected in the current consumption. In
order to understand the e¤ects of each of the monetary regimes on the stabilization of the domestic variables
it is useful to introduce a new variable: the consumption gap dened as the di¤erence between the current
consumption in the sticky price environment and the consumption under the exible price environment. We
can write the log - linearized (around the e¢ cient steady state) Euler condition in terms of consumption gaps:
dCgapt = dCgapt+1   1  bRt   bt+i+1   dRRnt  (41)
where: dCgapt = bCt cCnt ; cCnt   natural rate of consumption, i.e. consumption in the exible price equilibrium,dRRnt   the natural real interest rate, i.e. the real interest rate in the exible price equilibrium. Performing innite
recursions on (41) we obtain that the current consumption gap di¤erential is determined by current and future
real interest rate gap di¤erentials in the sticky and exible price environment:
dCgapt =  Et 1X
i=0
1

h bRt+i   bt+i+1  dRRnt+ii (42)
Additionally by combining equations (40) and (41) current real exchange rate can be represented as:
cRSt = Et 1X
i=0
h dRRnt+i   dRRnt+ii+  dCgapt   dCgapt (43)
The above relation gives us very useful insights concerning the nature of any monetary rule studied as
compared to the exible price equilibrium where the monetary rule cannot a¤ect the economy.
If the real interest rates were above the natural ones in the domestic economy then this would have an
additional appreciation e¤ect on the real exchange rate, which is associated with deation or/and nominal
appreciation of the currency. On the other hand if the real interest rates were below the natural ones in the
domestic economy this would lead to an additional depreciation e¤ect on the current real exchange rate, which
is associated with ination or/and nominal depreciation of the currency.
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6 Monetary regimes comparison
6.1 Parameterization
We follow the previous literature on the EMU accession economies (i.e. Laxton and Pesenti (2003), Natalucci
and Ravenna (2003)) we calibrate the model to match moments of the variables for the Czech Republic economy.
The degree of openness of the small open economy , , is assumed to be 0.4 which implies that the imported
consumption constitutes for around 40% of the tradable consumption. The share of nontradables in the aggregate
consumption, , is assumed to be 0.42. These values are in accordance with the corresponding weights in CPI
index for the Czech Republic over the period 2000-2005 (see Table 1 in Appendix B). Moreover, the share of
nontradable consumption in the foreign aggregate consumption () is assumed to be 0.6, consistent with the
value chosen by Benigno and Thoenisen (2003) for the euro area economy.
The discount factor, , equals 0.99 implying the annual interest rate of around 4 percent. Following Stockman
and Tesar (1995) we assume that inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution, , is set to 2. As in Laxton
and Pesenti (2003) we assume that inverse of labour supply elasticity, , is equal to 4. The elasticity of
substitution between tradable and nontradable consumption, , is set to 0.5 as in Stockman and Tesar (1995)
and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradables, , is assumed to be 1.5 following Backus
et al (1995). The elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods, , is equal 10, which together with the
revenue tax of 0.127 implies a markup of 1.2328 .
The degree of price rigidity in the nontraded sector, N , is chosen to be 0.85. The degree of price rigidity
in the tradable sectors, H and F , are slightly smaller and equal 0.8. These values are a bit higher than the
values reported in the micro and macro studies for the euro area countries.29 At the same time, they are in
accordance with Smets and Wouters (2003) who calibrate their model to the euro area data and Natalucci and
Ravenna (2003)30 who choose these values for the EMU accession countries.
The shock processes are assumed to follow autoregressive processes AR(1). The parameters of the shocks
are chosen to match the historical moments of the variables (see Table 2 in Appendix A). Following Natalucci
and Ravenna (2003) and Laxton and Pesenti (2003), the productivity shocks in both domestic sectors are
characterised by a strong persistence parameter equal to 0.85. Standard deviations of productvity shocks are
set to 1.6% (nontraded sector) and 1.8% (traded sector).These values are consistent in magnitude with values
chosen by Natalucci and Ravenna (2003), i.e. 1.8% (nontraded sector) and 2% (traded sector). Additionally,
we assume that productivity shocks are strongly correlated, their correlation coe¢ cient is set to 0.7.31 Other
27This value represents the average share of Taxes less Subsidies in the Gross Domestic Product at 1995 constant prices in the
Czech Republic for the years 1995-2006 (source: Eurostat).
28Martins et al. (1996) estimate the average markup for manufacturing sectors at around 1.2 in most OECD countries over the
period 1980-1992. Some studies (Morrison (1994), Domowitz et al (1988)) suggest that the plausible estimates range between 1.2
and 1.7.
29Stahl (2004) estimates that the average duration between price adjustment in the manufacturing sector is 9 months (i.e. degree
of price rigidity is 0.67). On the other hand, Gali et al (2001) and Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2003) estimate the aggregate supply
relations for the European countries and nd that overall degree of price rigidity for these countries to be 0.78.
30They argue that the existence of a high share of regulated prices in the EMU accession countries justies such a high value of
price stickiness.
31Empirical evidence suggests that sector productivity shocks are strongly correlated (see e.g. Backus et al (1992)).
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shocks are independent of each other. Parameters dening the preference shock are, 0.72% (standard deviation)
and 0.95 (persistence parameter).32 Parameters of the foreign consumption shock are estimated using quarterly
data on aggregate consumption in the euro area over the period 1990-2005 (source: Eurostat). The standard
deviation of the foreign consumption shock is equal to 0.23% and its persistence parameter is 0.85.
In order to match the historical moments of the Czech Republic economy, we parameterize the monetary
policy rule, i.e. the nominal interest rate follows the rule described by: bRt = 0:9 bRt 1+0:1(bt+0:2bYt+0:3bSt)+b"R;t; where b"R;t is the monetary policy innovation with a standard deviation ) 0.4%. In Table 3 (in the Appendix
B) we present comparison of the model moments with the historical moments.
Finally, for the purpose of our analysis regarding performance of the monetary regimes, we specify each of
the regimes by assigning specic values of the feedback coe¢ cients in the monetary rule (see (36)). In particular:
 a xed exchange rate regime (a strict peg to the currency of the foreign economy) is described as the
monetary rule with  = 0; S !1,
 a exible exchange rate regime in which the monetary rule stabilises CPI ination is described as the
monetary rule with  !1; S = 0,
 a managed oat exchange rate regime in which the monetary rule stabilises CPI ination and nominal
exchange rate is described as the monetary rule with  = 2; S = 0:025 and the smoothing parameter
 = 0:9.33
6.2 Impulse responses to the domestic and foreign shocks
We study how the small domestic economy responds to the domestic and foreign shocks. First we identify the
common patterns of responses of the key domestic variables that are present in the exible price environment
and under all the considered regimes. Next we identify the sources of di¤erences in the response of each of the
regimes by analyzing behaviour of the consumption gap (see (43)). Finally we evaluate the monetary regimes
taking as a point of reference their ability to comply with the Maastricht criteria.
6.2.1 Domestic supply shocks
We examine the e¤ects of domestic productivity shocks in both sectors (see Figure (5) and (6) in Appendix
B). Both productivity shocks result in the real exchange rate depreciation in the exible price environment and
also under all the regimes. An imperfect substitution between all types of goods leads to a decline in domestic
prices and the real exchange depreciation. Moreover we observe a decline in the natural real interest rate which
is associated with the increase in the domestic aggregate consumption. Subsequently the expenditure switching
e¤ect leads to an increase in the domestic aggregate output.
32These values are similar to the values chosen by Laxton and Pesenti (2003), 0.4% (standard deviation) and 0.7 (persistence
parameter).
33The specic values of the feedback coe¢ cients are taken from Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) and represent estimates of Taylor
rules for the OECD countries.
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Importantly the magnitude of the real exchange rate depreciation di¤ers for the two shocks analyzed. This
can be understood by observing the changes in relative prices (see (38)). Productivity shocks in the nontraded
sector lead to a decline in the domestic terms of trade and a rise in international terms of trade. Both changes
have a depreciation e¤ect on the real exchange rate. On the other hand productivity shocks in the traded
productivity sector result in a rise of both types of relative prices with the opposing e¤ects on the real exchange
rate.
The di¤erences in response of the economy under the alternative regimes are summarized by the consumption
gap (see equations (41), (43)). Since the productivity shocks entail deationary pressures the magnitude of a
change in the nominal interest will depend on the importance which is attached to ination changes in each of
the alternative monetary rules and also to the uctuations in the nominal exchange rate. Not surprisingly CPI
targeting results in the strongest decline of the nominal interest rate and a positive consumption gap. On the
other hand the peg regime, not able to use the nominal interest rate to stabilize the economy, is characterized
by the strongest deation followed later by ination and a negative consumption gap.
The stabilization under CPI targeting regime involves a high response of the nominal interest rate and a
nonstationary depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.34 On the other hand peg regime guarantees stabiliza-
tion of the nominal exchange rate but at the expense of deation and a fall in real wage. Importantly complete
stabilisation of the nominal exchange rate guarantees the stationarity of aggregate price level which is reected
in the pattern of aggregate ination: rst it declines and then it rises after several quarters. The managed
oat is characterized by the intermediate responses: the smoothed character of the Taylor rule and moderate
response coe¢ cients towards ination and nominal exchange rate result in the muted hump - shaped response of
the nominal interest rate. Consistent with the ndings of Benigno and Benigno (2004) we observe depreciation
followed by appreciation under this regime. Similarly we also report deation (of the magnitude similar to the
peg regime) followed by small ination. The magnitudes of these short run e¤ects depend on respectively re-
sponse coe¢ cient towards ination and response coe¢ cient towards nominal exchange rate. Finally persistence
of deation under this regime depends on the smoothing parameter.
Notice that these results are on the contrary to the ndings of Devereux (2003) and Natalucci and Ravenna
(2003) who report that CPI ination targeting leads to excessive recession when responding to domestic supply
shocks in the tradable sector. The main di¤erence in results originates from the assumption on the endogeneity
of terms of trade.
6.2.2 Domestic demand shocks
Now we analyze the response of the domestic economy to the government expenditure shocks in the nontraded
sector (see Figure (7) in Appendix B). The domestic preference shock leads to a direct increase in domestic
consumption. Natural rate of interest rate increases resulting in the real exchange rate appreciation. An
additional domestic demand boosts production in both domestic sectors and subsequently leads to a rise in real
34This nding is consistent with the study of Benigno and Benigno (2004), i.e. nonstationary behaviour of the nominal exchange
rate can be generated by the real shocks drawn from the stationary distribution in the exible exchange rate regimes.
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wages and higher real marginal cost. Domestic goods become relatively more expensive which is reected in
improved terms of trade and also a rise in domestic terms of trade.
We identify the di¤erences between the alternative regimes by examining the behavior of the consumption
gap. Note that domestic demand shocks lead to inationary pressures and the real exchange rate appreciation.
The CPI targeting is characterized by the highest increase in the nominal interest as this regime aims at
stabilizing ination. This response results in a negative consumption gap and a higher real exchange rate
appreciation leading to a smaller expansion in the economy. On the other hand the peg regime allowing for
ination (which is later balanced by a small deation so that aggregate price level is stationary) and also
the highest rise in real wage reports a positive consumption gap resulting in a smaller real exchange rate
appreciation and a boom in the economy. The managed oat regime is characterised by moderate change in the
nominal interest rate which stabilises partially nominal exchange rate (depreciation followed by appreciation)
and ination (followed by deation). However the change in ination under this regime is of the same magnitude
as under the peg regime.
It is worth pointing out that since in our setting the domestic demand shocks lead to the real exchange rate
appreciation and ination we face the same evaluation of the regimes as Devereux (2003) and Natalucci and
Ravenna (2003) for the domestic traded productivity shocks.
6.2.3 Foreign shocks
Importantly the peg regime accomodates all the foreign shocks by setting the nominal interest rate that guar-
antees stability of the nominal exchange rate.
The general pattern of response of the domestic economy to the foreign shocks depends on the way foreign
aggregate consumption and also foreign real interest rate are a¤ected. In particular foreign supply shocks lead
to an increase in the foreign consumption and decline in the foreign real interest rate. Foreign demand shocks
result in an increase in the foreign consumption and an increase in the foreign real interest rate.35 A change
in the foreign consumption leads to a change of the same sign in the domestic aggregate consumption (through
the risk sharing condition (16)) At the same time we also observe a change in the real exchange rate (induced
by a change in the foreign real interest rate) which a¤ects adversely aggregate output through the expenditure
switching e¤ect. 36 Subsequently, the domestic natural rate of interest changes to a lesser extent than the
foreign one.
In our experiment foreign consumption increase is associated with a decrease in the foreing real interest rate.
Importantly, peg regime is characterised by a decline in the nominal interest rate which guarantees stability of
the nominal exchange rate (see Figure (8) in the Appendix B). As a result, we observe a signicant ination
and a positive consumption gap.
The remaining regimes allowing for some degree of the nominal exchange rate exibility choose a di¤erent
35The mechanisms of the e¤ects of the foreign shocks on the foreign variables are similar to the ones explained in the previous
subsections.
36The strength of the expenditure switching e¤ect depends on the structural parameters, i.e. elasticity of demand between home
and foreign tradables and also the domestic monetary policy.
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response in the domestic nominal interest as both of them, to a di¤erent extent, are concerned with the in-
ationary pressures which arise through the changes in ination of the import sector and real exchange rate
movements. That is why their responses are muted in comparison to the exible price economy and lead to a
negative consumption gap.
6.2.4 An overall evaluation of the monetary regimes performance
Till now, we have analysed how monetary regimes respond to domestic and foreign shocks. But how these
di¤erent responses a¤ect ability of monetary regimes to comply with the Maastricht criteria? In order to
answer this question we reformulate the Maastricht criteria in two important dimensions.37 First, we state
the Maastricht criteria in quarterly terms. Second, we reformulate the upper bounds on levels into the upper
bounds on variances of the Maastricht variables. The upper bounds on variances are calculated in such a way
that compliance with the reformulated criterion gives 95% probability that the original criterion on levels is
satised.38 Subsequently, a criterion will be satised (violated) when the variance of the respective Maastricht
variable is lower (higher) than the upper bound.
In Table 1 we present variances of the Maastricht variables under alternative monetary regimes. We nd that
none of the regimes satises all the Maastricht criteria. While the nominal exchange rate criterion is satised
by all the regimes there exists a trade-o¤ between compliance with nominal interest rate criterion and CPI
ination criterion. Not suprisingly, CPI targeting regime fails to satisfy the nominal interest rate criterion. On
the other hand, peg regime fails to satisfy the CPI ination criterion. The above trade-o¤ is well reected in
variances induced by the managed oat regime. Under this regime, variance of the nominal interest rate almost
hits the upper bound of the criterion. But still it is not enough to guarantee stabilization of the CPI ination
rate in accordance with the Maastricht criterion.
Which of the regimes performs the best with respect to Maastricht criteria? Overall, managed oat guaran-
tees moderate variances of all Maastricht variables. Interestingly, this regime also induces the smallest variance
of the consumption gap (as shown in Table 1 below). This indicates that both from the points of view of
compliance with the Maastricht criteria and at the same time e¢ ciency monetary regime in the EMU Accession
countries should allow for some exibility in stabilization of CPI ination and the nominal exchange rate.39
37This reformulation methodology of the Maastricht criteria is explained in the Appendix A. Lipinska (2008a) provides a thorough
discussion regarding this reformulation.
38A similar approach of reformulating the criteria was undertaken by Natalucci and Ravenna (2007).
39This result is similar to Devereux (2003) and Natalucci and Ravenna (2003).
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Table 1: Variances of the Maastricht variables and consumption gap under alternative regimes (LCP)
CPI ination nominal interest rate nominal exchange rate consumption gap
CPI targeting 0 0.60 21.03 0.35
managed oat 0.15 0.06 6.10 0.20
peg regime 0.27 0.02 0 0.63
bound 0.04 0.06 58.57 -
note: Variances and bounds are multiplied by 1002 (in (%)2)
7 Sensitivity analysis
The theoretical analysis of the real exchange rate determination in the long and short run enabled us to identify
the structural parameters that can a¤ect the responses of the small domestic economy to di¤erent shocks. In
the long run perspective we discussed that a share of nontraded goods, a degree of openness and also a degree
of substitution between home and foreign goods a¤ect the magnitude of a change in the real exchange rate.
Additionally in the short run a degree of exchange rate pass through in the domestic economy can alter the
performance of the small domestic economy.
7.1 The long run analysis - openness of economy
Share of nontradables and degree of openness (dened as the share of imports in the tradable consumption)
give us the insight on how open the economy is: a high share of nontradables together with small degree of
openness indicate a relatively closed economy and a small share of nontradables together with a high degree
of openness describe a more open economy. Changes in the degree of openness, share of nontradables and
also degree of substitution between home and foreign goods a¤ect the magnitude of the movements in the
exible price equilibrium real exchange rate (see equation (38)). Importantly the more open economy is the
stronger interdependence between nominal exchange rate movements and the inationary pressures. The higher
the degree of substitutability between home and foreign goods the smaller movements in the terms of trade
and traded ination. Figures (9), (10), (11) in Appendix B present variances of the Maastricht variables and
also consumption gap as functions of the share of nontraded consumption, degree of openness and degree of
substitution between home and foreign goods.
We nd that the ability of the monetary regimes to comply with the Maastricht criteria depends in a
substantial way on openness of domestic economy and the degree of subsitutability of traded goods. Importantly,
managed oat regime and peg regime can satisfy the CPI ination criterion provided that share of nontradables
is small and/or degre of openness is high and/or home and foreign goods and good substitutes. On the other
hand, CPI targeting regime does not satisfy nominal interest rate criterion no matter how open the economy
is.40 Finally, nominal exchange rate criterion is always satisifed by all the regimes. Not surprisingly, variance
40Variance of the nominal interest rate under this regime remains above the upper bound for all the parameter congurations
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of the nominal exchange rate decreases for the CPI targeting and managed oat regime with the more open
economy and the higher degree of substitutability of traded goods.
Additionally, we control on how close di¤erent regimes are with respect to the exible price equilibrium by
studying variance of consumption gap. It appears that the more open economy is managed oat and peg regime
not only are characterised by an increased ability to satisfy the Maastricht criteria but also they are closer to
the e¢ cient exible price equilibrium.
7.2 The short run analysis- exchange rate pass through
Our benchmark model assumes that there is a delayed pass through reected in the local currency pricing (LCP).
Importantly, the delayed pass-through diminishes the expenditure switching role of the nominal exchange rate.
That is why, the managed exchange rate regimes outperform41 the exible exchange rate regimes in such an
environment (Devereux and Engel (2003)). On the other hand, when exchange rate pass-through is high then
nominal exchange rate movements enable necessary relative price adjustments in the environment where prices
are sticky and the country faces real country-specic shocks (Friedman (1953)). Having these results in mind, we
study how the assumption of instead high-pass through a¤ects the relative performance of monetary regimes, i.e.
the ability of alternative monetary regimes to comply with the Maastricht criteria. We compare local currency
pricing environment with producer currency pricing (PCP).
In Table 2 we present variances of the Maastricht variables under alternative regimes. First of all, none of the
regimes satises all the criteria. Interestingly, variances of the Maastricht variables under the CPI targeting and
the managed regime are smaller than under LCP.42 The high pass-through of the nominal exchange rate under
PCP enables fast relative price adjustment under these regimes. Thanks to this, both the nominal exchange rate
and nominal interest rate are characterised by a smaller variance than under LCP.43 Note that, in accordance
with the discussion above, CPI targeting regime is characterised by the smallest variance of the consumption
gap.
Table 2: Variances of the Maastricht variables and consumption gap under alternative regimes (PCP)
CPI ination nominal interest rate nominal exchange rate consumption gap
CPI targeting 0 0.15 8.97 0.27
managed oat 0.09 0.05 5.51 0.35
peg regime 0.27 0.02 0 0.63
bound 0.04 0.06 58.57 -
note: Variances and bounds are multiplied by 1002 (in (%)2)
(; ; ).
41are characterised by higher welfare.
42Figure (13) in Appendix B presents variances of the Maastricht variables and also the consumption gap as a function of price
stickiness in the import sector.
43Compare gures (5) and (12) that represent impulse responses to the domestic productivity shock in the nontraded sector
under LCP and PCP respectively.
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Finally, we control whether these results are dependent on how open the domestic economy is. In Figures
(14) and (15) in Appendix B we present variances of the Maastricht variables and consumption gap as a function
of the share of nontraded consumption and degree of openness. Interestingly, CPI targeting regime can satisfy
all the criteria provided that the degree of openness of the economy is high. This is due to the fact that variance
of the nominal interest rate under CPI targeting regime diminishes with both higher degree of openness and
smaller share of nontradables (on the contrary to the LCP case). Moreover, this regime is also the closest to
the e¢ cient exible price equilibrium as it implies the smallest variance of the consumption gap. This result is
robust to all the parameter specication of the share of nontraded consumption and degree of openness.
8 Conclusions
This paper studies the ability of di¤erent monetary regimes in the EMU Accession countries to satisfy with the
Maastricht criteria regarding the CPI ination, nominal interest rate and nominal exchange rate. We identify
some common characteristics of these countries regarding both a structure of the economy and its stochastic
environment which can inuence the current choices of the monetary regimes in these countries and also their
performance. Then we build a two - country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model representing a small
open economy - one of the EMU accession countries and a big country - the euro area. This framework enables
us to conduct policy experiments consisting in analyzing the e¤ects of di¤erent monetary regimes on the way a
small open economy responds to the set of domestic and foreign shocks. The studied monetary regimes roughly
aim to reect the monetary choices already made in the EMU accession countries: the xed regime, the managed
oat and the CPI targeting regime.
The analysis suggests that ability of regimes to satisfy the Maastricht criteria depends on openness of an
economy and substitutability of home and foreign goods. At the same time, degree of exchange rate pass through
plays an important role. as it a¤ects to a great extent variances of the Maastricht variables. Importantly, there
exists a trade-o¤ between satisfying the nominal interest rate and ination criterion. We nd that for many
parameter specications there is no regime which complies with all the Maastricht criteria. Higher degree of
openness and strong substitutability of traded goods enables some of the regimes to comply with the criteria.
However the ultimate choice of the regime which satises all the criteria depends on exchange rate-pass through.
That can imply that the design of the regime that would satisfy all the Maastricht criteria is a of more complex
nature. Moreover, we obtain for some parameterizations that if the regime satises all the criteria it is also
characterized by the smallest consumption gap. That can imply that in this situation there is no trade-o¤
between fullllment of the Maastricht criteria and desirability of the e¢ cient outcome. However in order to
answer these two issues properly, a proper welfare analysis together with the derivation of the optimal policy
constrained by the Maastricht criteria is needed. We cover these topics in Chapter 2.
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A Derivation of the model
A.1 E¢ cient steady state characterisation
We dene a deterministic steady state with zero ination rate. There are no productivity shocks (AH = AN = 1):
Other domestic shock: preference shock is assumed to take constant values (B = B). In order to eliminate
rigidities present as a result of the monopolistic competition in both domestic sectors we impose optimal subsidies
(N ; H) which values constitute for the solution of the social planner.
The social planner chooses subsidies (N ; H) in order to maximise welfare of the domestic consumers subject
to the aggregate constraints of the economy:
max(U(C;B)  V (L)) (A.1)
s:t: (A.2)
C = RS
1
C

(A.3)
1 = p1 N + (1  )p1 T (A.4)
p1 T = (1  )p1 H + p1 F RS
1 
(A.5)
YN = p
 
N C (A.6)
YH = (1  )(1  )p H p T C + (1  )p H RS

p F C

(A.7)
Foreign variables: pF and C

are derived from the similar social planners problem for the rest of the world
assuming that such an economy is a closed one.
A.2 Log - linearisation around the e¢ cient steady state
We approximate the model around the above dened steady state. We present the loglinearised equations for
the exible price equilibrium and the sticky price equilibrium of the small open economy. Our set of shocks is
composed of the domestic supply shocks: AN;t; AH;t, domestic demand shock: Bt and foreign shocks: Ct : We
assume that bt ; bF;t and also bT d;t are zero (i.e. the rest of the world economy follows price stability policy).
A.2.1 The exible price equilibrium - small open economy
Supply Nontraded sector:
(1  b) bT dt =   bANt + b!t (A.8)
where b = (T dpT )1 :
Domestic traded goods:
 internal consumption:
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 b bT dt   abTt =   bAHt + b!t (A.9)
where a = (RSp

F
pT
)1 :
Domestic labour supply:
 cCt + b!t   (Y N
Y
bYN;t + Y H
Y
bYH;t   YH
Y
bAHt   YN
Y
bANt ) = 0 (A.10)
Demand Nontraded consumption:
bYN;t = cCt   (1  b) bT dt (A.11)
Domestic traded consumption:
bYH;t = dCTabTt + dCT ( bCt + b bT dt ) + (1  dCT ) bTt + (1  dCT ) bCt (A.12)
where dCT =
p H p
 
T (1 )(1 )C
Y H
:
Aggregate output denition:
bYt = dyn(bYN;t + (1  b) bT dt ) + dyh(bYH;t   b bT dt   abTt) (A.13)
where dyn = pNYN
Y
; dyh = pHYH
Y
:
Risk sharing:
bCt = bCt   1 cRSt   bBt (A.14)
Euler condition:
dRRt = ( bCt+1   bCt)  ( bBt+1   bBt) (A.15)
wheredRRt = bRt   bt+1:
Denition of the real exchange rate:
dRSt =  bcT dt + (1  a) bTt (A.16)
A.2.2 The sticky price equilibrium
Supply Nontraded sector:
bN;t = kN (  bANt + b!t   (1  b) bT dt ) + EtbN;t+1 (A.17)
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Domestic traded goods:
 internal consumption:
bH;t = kH(  bAHt + b!t + b bT dt + abTt) + EtbH;t+1 (A.18)
 export consumption:
bH;t = kH(  bAHt + b!t   cRSt + bT t ) + EtbH;t+1 (A.19)
Foreign traded goods:
bF;t = kF (  bAFt + b!t + cRSt   (1  a) bTt + b bT dt ) + EtbF;t+1 (A.20)
Labour supply:
 cCt + b!t   (Y N
Y
bYN;t + Y H
Y
bYH;t   YH
Y
bAHt   YN
Y
bANt ) = 0 (A.21)
Demand Nontraded consumption:
bYN;t = cCt   (1  b) bT dt (A.22)
Traded consumption:
bYH;t = dCTabTt + dCT ( bCt + b bT dt ) + (1  dCT ) bT t + (1  dCT ) bCt (A.23)
where dCT =
p H p
 
T (1 )(1 )C
Y H
:
Resource constraint:
bYt = dyn(bYN;t + (1  b) bT dt ) + dyh(bYH;t   b bT dt   abTt) (A.24)
where dyn = pNYN
Y
; dyh = pHYH
Y
:
Risk sharing:
bCt = bCt   1 cRSt   bBt (A.25)
Euler condition:
Et( bCt+1   bBt+1) = ( bCt   bBt) + bRt   Etbt+1 (A.26)
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Monetary rule:
bRt = (1  )bt + S(1  )bSt +  bRt 1 + b"mpt (A.27)
Prices bt = bH;t + b( bT dt   bT dt 1) + a( bTt   bTt 1) (A.28)
bT dt   bT dt 1 =  bT;t + bN;t (A.29)
bTt   bTt 1 = bF;t   bH;t (A.30)
bT t   bT t 1 = bF;t   bH;t (A.31)
cRSt = bSt + (bt   bt) (A.32)
bSt = bSt   bSt 1 (A.33)
cRSt = cRSt   cRSt 1 (A.34)
A.3 Parameterization
We present values of the structural parameters and also values of the stochastic parameters chosen in the
numerical exercise.
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Table B.1: Structural parameters
The parameter denition value of the parameter
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution  2
inverse of the labour supply elasticity  4
discount factor  0.99
intratemporal elasticity between variety of the goods  10
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradables  1.5
elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables  0.5
share of nontradables  0.42
degree of openness  0.4
price rigidity in the nontradable sector N 0.85
price rigidity in the tradable sectors H ; H ; F 0.8
steady state share of taxes in the nontradable sector N 0.1
steady state share of taxes in the tradable sector H 0.1
share of nontradables in the foreign economy  0.6
Table B.2: Stochastic environment
shocks autoregressive parameter standard deviation (in %)
nontradable productivity (AN ) 0.85 1.6
tradable productivity (AH) 0.85 1.8
preference (B) 0.95 0.72
foreign consumption (C) 0.85 0.23
corr( bAN;t; bAH;t) = 0:7 where corr - correlation coe¢ cient
Note: The policy rule is calibrated following Natalucci and Ravenna (2003): bRt = 0:9 bRt 1+0:1(bt+0:2bYt+
0:3bSt) + b"R;t; where SD(b"R;t) = 0:45:
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Table B.3: Matching the moments
Statistics My framework Natalucci and Ravenna (2003)
Standard deviation in % Model Historical Model Historical
Output: 1.74 1.68 1.53 1.74
nontraded sector 1.76 1.56 2.72 1.55
traded sector 3.68 4.32 2.87 2.25
Consumption 1.79 1.93 2.28 2.29
Nominal interest rate 0.52 0.52 0.48 0.47
Nominal exchange rate 2.60 2.59 2.79 3.04
Real exchange rate 3.19 3.62 2.48 2.75
CPI ination rate: 0.56 0.91 1.1 1.08
nontraded sector 0.61 0.97 0.79 2.61
traded sector 0.94 0.74 2.4 0.99
Note: For comparison purposes the table shows also the results of the paper by Natalucci and Ravenna
(2003). The model moments are theoretical.
As far as the historical statistics are concerned our data sample for the Czech Republic is 1995:1 - 2006:2
(Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) database is 1994:1 - 2003:1). CPI ination rate in the traded and nontraded
sector data sample is 2000:1 - 2006:2. All series are logged (except for interest and ination rates) and Hodrick
- Prescott ltered. Rates of change are quarterly.
All data were collected from the Eurostat webpage (the data in Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) were collected
from the OECD publication Statistical Compendium (2003) and the Czech Republic National Accounts (July
2003)). Data are seasonally adjusted where appropriate. We present the detailed data series. Output: Gross
value added (GVA) at 1995 constant prices in national currency. Traded output is an aggregate of sectoral GVA
for: Agriculture; Hunting; Forestry and Fishing; Total industry (excluding construction). Nontraded output is
an aggregate of sectoral GVA for: Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal
household goods; Hotels and restaurants; Transport, storage and communication; Financial intermediation, real
estate, renting and business activities. Consumption: Final consumption expenditure of households at 1995
constant prices in national currency. Nominal interest rate: three months T - bill interest rate. Nominal
exchange rate: Bilateral Koruny/euro exchange rate (quarterly average). Real exchange rate: CPI based
real e¤ective exchange rate (6 trading partners, quarterly average). CPI ination rate: Harmonised Index of
Consumer Prices (HICP). CPI ination rate in the nontraded sector: HICP - Services. CPI ination in the
traded sector: HICP - Goods.
33
Table B.4: Variance decomposition of the Maastricht variables under the benchmark rule
shocks:
variables: AN AH B C
CPI ination 70% 3% 26% 0.5%
nominal interest rate 58% 3% 24% 15%
nominal exchange rate 32% 1.5% 27% 40%
A.4 Reinterpretation of the Maastricht convergence criteria
First, we summarize the Maastricht criteria by the following inequalities:
 CPI aggregate ination criterion
At   A;t  B; (A.35)
where B = 1:5%; At is annual CPI aggregate ination in the domestic economy, 
A;
t is the average of
the annual CPI aggregate inations in the three lowest ination countries of the European Union.
 nominal interest rate criterion
RLt  RL;At  CR (A.36)
where CR = 2%; RLt is the annul interest rate for ten-year government bond in the domestic economy,
RL;At is the average of the annual interest rates for ten-year government bonds in the three countries of
the European Union with the lowest ination rates.
 nominal exchange rate criterion
(1 DS)S  St  (1 +DS)S; (A.37)
As explained in the main text, we restate the criteria in the quarterly terms. That means, that the bounds
B and CR have to be adjusted, i.e. B = 4
p
1; 015  1 and
CR = 4
p
1; 02 1: Assuming that shocks are normally distributed we can reformulate the original Maastricht
criteria into the criteria which set upper bounds on variances of the Maastricht variables:
k  SD(bt)  B; (A.38)
k  SD( bRt)  CR; (A.39)
k  SD( bSt)  DS : (A.40)
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where SD   standard deviation. Parameter k = 1:96 guarantees that compliance with the reformulated
criteria gives 95% of probability that the original criteria are satised.
B Tables and gures
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Figure 1: Total annual labour productivity growth in the EMU Accession countries and EU-15 (annual rates in
%) for the period 2000-2008. Values fro 2007 and 2008 are forecasts.
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Structure of the EMU accession economies
degree of openness
countries monetary
regime
share of
nontradables
in
consumption
(average
2000 - 2005)
share of imports
in GDP (at current
prices, average
2000-2007)
share of
foreign traded
consumption
in the traded
consumption
(average 2000
- 2004)
Czech Republic managedfloat 42% 68% 36%
Estonia peg 39% 86% 48%
Hungary managedfloat 44% 71% 30%
Latvia peg 37% 55% 35%
Lithuania peg 33% 58% 23%
Poland CPI targeting 37% 35% 13%
Slovenia managedfloat 49% 59% 36%
Slovakia managedfloat 41% 78% 34%
average 40% 64% 32%
Note: We provide two alternative measures of the degree of openness since in our
model openness is measured as the share of foreign traded consumption in the
traded consumption.
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Figure 2: CPI ination rates in the EMU accession countries since their accession to the EU (annual rates in
%)
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Figure 3: EMU convergence criterion bond yields for the EMU Accession countries since their accession to the
EU (annual rates in %)
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Figure 4: Nominal exchange rate uctuations vs. euro of the EMU accession countries since the accession to
the EU (average monthly changes since the EU accession date)
37
B.1 Impulse responses
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of the Maastricht variables and the consumption to the domestic nontradable
productivity shock (LCP)
Figure 6: Impulse responses of the Maastricht variables and the consumption to the domestic tradable produc-
tivity shock (LCP)
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Figure 7: Impulse responses of the Maastricht variables and the consumption gap to the domestic preference
shock (LCP)
Figure 8: Impulse responses of the Maastricht variables and the consumption gap to the foreign consumption
shock
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Figure 9: Variances of the Maastricht variables and the consumption gap as a function of the share of nontraded
consumption (LCP)
Figure 10: Variances of the Maastricht variables and the consumption gap as a function of the degree of openness
(LCP)
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Figure 11: Variances of the Maastricht variables and the consumption gap as a function of the degree of
substitutability between home and foreign goods (LCP)
Figure 12: Impulse responses of the Maastricht variables and the consumption gap to the domestic nontradable
productivity shock (PCP)
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Figure 13: Variances of the Maastricht variables and the consumption gap as a function of the degree of price
stickiness in the import sector (LCP)
Figure 14: Variances of the Maastricht variables and the consumption gap as a function of the share of nontraded
consumption (PCP)
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Figure 15: Variances of the Maastricht variables and the consumption gap as a function of the degree of openness
(PCP)
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